Norplant: The New Scarlet Letter? by Flannery, Michael T.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 15 
1992 
Norplant: The New Scarlet Letter? 
Michael T. Flannery 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Michael T. Flannery, Norplant: The New Scarlet Letter?, 8 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 201 (1992). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol8/iss1/15 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
NORPLANT: THE NEW SCARLET LETTER?
Michael T. Flannery*
[W]hat is it but to laugh in the faces of our godly magistrates, and
make a pride out of what they, worthy gentlemen, meant for a
punishment?1
Hester Prynne lived in the eighteenth century in an early New England,
Puritan colony and is a character of Nathaniel Hawthorne's classic Ameri-
can novel, The Scarlet Letter.2 Darlene Johnson was born in 1964 and pres-
ently lives in California.' Except for the decision of Judge Howard
Broadman,4 these two women would have nothing in common. However,
when Judge Broadman ordered Darlene Johnson to undergo the implanta-
tion of Norplant5 to effectuate sterilization,6 the two women then shared a
common bond: for the crime they each committed, both were sentenced, in
effect, to shame. Hester's crime was adultery; Darlene's crime was child
abuse." What is ironic is that in an age when criminals were chained to the
* Assistant City Solicitor, Law Department, City of Philadelphia; B.A., The University
of Delaware; J.D., The Catholic University of America, The Columbus School of Law. The
legal arguments presented in this essay are not necessarily indicative of the author's moral
disposition regarding the use of Norplant.
1. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 51 (Bantam Classic ed., Bantam
Books 1989) (1850).
2. Id.
3. See In re Johnson, No. 29-390 (Tulare County Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 2, 1991) appeal
dismissed (5th Cir. 1992).
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
6. Technically, an argument may be made that the use of Norplant is not the equivalent
of sterilization since the effects of Norplant are completely reversible with the simple removal
of the implantation. See Carey Q. Gelernter, Another Choice: New Contraceptive Holds Prom-
ise, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 1991, § 6, at 7 (discussing medical, legal, and social effects of the
drug); Stephen M. Lieb, Judge Orders Contraception, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 15, 1991, at B6 (distin-
guishing between sterilization and birth control). Rather, Norplant should be considered a
form of birth control since fertility is resumed with the first menstrual cycle subsequent to
removal of the tubes. See Sylvia Rubin, Birth Control Breakthrough, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28,
1991, at B3. For example, the Delaware Code defines sterilization as "any surgical or medical
procedure intended to render a person permanently unable to procreate." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 5701(a) (1983 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). Because Norplant does not render
the individual permanently incapable of procreation, its use would not qualify as sterilization
under this state statute. For purposes of this Essay, however, sterilization and Norplant are
recognized as substantially similar in their effectiveness as forms of birth control.
7. Darlene Johnson pleaded guilty to charges of child abuse after beating her children
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stocks and burned at the stake, Hester Prynne was sentenced to wear the
embroidered letter "A" on her bosom while in an age when privacy rights
are a fundamental element of societal integrity, Darlene Johnson was sen-
tenced to be physically prevented from conceiving children.' Perhaps to
Judge Broadman, the irony was not so apparent and the sentence of Hester
Prynne was not so unusual.9 In fact, Judge Broadman has sentenced
criminals to wear articles of clothing on which their crime was embla-
zoned.'o Nevertheless, whether or not the irony was apparent, Judge How-
ard Broadman has sewn a new judicial thread by holding that in cases of
child abuse, Norplant will conveniently serve as the "scarlet letter" of the
twenty-first century.
INTRODUCTION
This Essay asserts that the mandatory and involuntary imposition of Nor-
plant is invalid as a punitive tool in sentencing convicted child abusers.
However, Norplant may serve as a rehabilitative tool for those who volunta-
rily consent to the implantation as either a means of sentence reduction or a
sentence option.
This Essay begins with a discussion of Norplant and how it has affected
with a belt. In re Johnson, No. 29-390 (Tulare County Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 2, 1991) appeal
dismissed (5th Cir. 1992).
8. Id.
9. Referring to some of his novel, unorthodox sentences, see infra note 10, including that
of Darlene Johnson, Judge Broadman has been quoted as saying: "I don't think these [rulings]
are that unusual .... If you look at them, they are linear, logical, common-sense decisions. I
don't think there is anything that controversial about them." Bill Ainsworth, 'I Take Away
People's Rights All the Time, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991, at 10, 11.
10. See Desda Moss, Court-Ordered Birth Control Draws Fire, USA TODAY, Jan. 10,
1991, at 2A (stating that Judge Broadman had ordered a felon to wear his crime-theft--on
his T-shirt as part of his probation). Russell Hackler, who had stolen two six packs of beer,
was ordered by Judge Broadman to wear a T-shirt that read on the front "MY RECORD
AND TWO SIX PACKS EQUAL FOUR YEARS" and on the back it read "I AM ON
FELONY PROBATION FOR THEFT." Hackler was subsequently arrested for another
theft after he was identified by the T-shirt. John Hurst, Controversial Judge Dodges Not Only
Critics, but Bullet, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1991, at A3, A15; Michael Lev, Judge Is Firm on
Forced Contraception, but Welcomes an Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1991, at A17.
Judge Broadman has rendered other unorthodox sentences from the bench, including order-
ing a defendant to learn how to read, requiring donations of personal property to charity,
allowing a child molester to serve his sentence at home provided a sign was posted outside of
the home that read, "Do not enter, I am under house arrest," and printing the names of 6,000
county residents, who owed fines, in the newspaper in an effort to stimulate payments. Mark
A. Stein, Judge Stirs Debate with Ordering of Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A3,
A31. Broadman also ordered an alcoholic to swallow the drug Antabuse, which would make
that person violently ill upon drinking alcohol. Id. A similar order was upheld in Jaco v.
Shields, 507 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Va. 1981) (requiring a parolee to take Antabuse is not cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
Norplant
both the medical and legal communities." Despite diverse opinions as to its
proper use, Norplant has already found its way into the courtroom and
heated the debate surrounding its social consequences. These consequences
will be discussed in Part I in both a factual and legal context. Part II will
briefly analyze the standard required to be used if the courts are to imple-
ment the mandatory use of Norplant for crimes of child abuse. 2 Such a
standard necessarily includes clear and convincing proof of prospective
abuse or neglect. The present status of the law pertaining to the use of
sterilization as a condition for sentence reduction is reviewed in Part III.13
This condition has been imposed in areas outside the scope of child abuse
and is becoming an increasingly important and controversial issue as Nor-
plant and other medical advances continue to develop and affect the repro-
ductive freedoms of women.' 4 This essay concludes that the mandatory
11. See infra notes 17-82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 98-154 and accompanying text.
14. Although Norplant is the first major breakthrough in the reproductive field since the
early 1960s, further advances in birth control technology are expected in the near future. For
example, one researcher at Vanderbilt University estimates that a reversible contraceptive for
men will be available in oral or injection form by the year 2000. Similar studies confirming this
finding have been conducted at Eastern Virginia Medical School and the Harbor-UCLA Medi-
cal Center, in which it has been predicted that the male birth control will take the form of
periodic injections or possibly an implantation similar to Norplant; further research on the
reversibility of the procedures is still required. See Cynthia Floyd, Male Contraceptive Pre-
dicted by 2000, Gannett News Serv., June 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gan-
nett News Serv. File; see also Mike Snider, Advances Made in Male Contraception, USA
TODAY, June 20, 1991, at 6D.
There have also been recent advances in birth control for women. During the past two
years, aside from Norplant, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has approved two other
forms of birth control: the cervical cap, a barrier contraceptive that fits over the cervix, and
ParaGard T380A, an improved version of the IUD. Marge Colborn, Hers? Future Methods
Promise Options, Gannett News Serv., Apr. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gan-
nett News Serv. File. Three other forms of birth control have been developed but have not yet
been approved by the FDA: the female condom, medicated disposable diaphragms, and the
FlexiGard 330 IUD. Id. None of these forms of birth control prevents sexually transmitted
diseases. Id.
Other advances in contraceptive technology are expected in the near future, including: Nor-
plant-like biodegradable implants that will be inserted under the skin but will dissolve in a
year; injectable microcapsules that will release hormones within the body and dissolve in six
months; monthly injections that will only minimally disrupt the menstrual cycle; a vaginal ring
that will have the same effect as the pill, but it will be effective for three months; a postcoital
contraceptive designed to prevent fertilization by causing the uterine lining to shed; a vaccine
that will disrupt gestation and prevent fertility; and a battery-operated device that will be
implanted within the cervix and will neutralize sperm. Id.
Despite these advances, the United States is far behind Western Europe in reproductive
technology. See Michael H. Hodges, Choices? U.S. Lags Behind Europe, Gannett News Serv.,
Apr. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gannett News Serv. File. There are over
twice as many teenage pregnancies in the United States compared with European countries.
19921
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imposition of Norplant is a violation of the fundamental right to procreate. 5
However, voluntary consent to the postconviction use of Norplant as a reha-
bilitative device is an effective waiver of this right and a valid factor to be
considered in sentencing. 16
I. NORPLANT
A. Factual Implications
On December 10, 1990, the Food and Drug Administration approved the
public use of Norplant as an acceptable and effective means of birth control,
and it is now widely distributed by Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories of Philadel-
phia. 7 It has been hailed as the first new birth control device available in
the past twenty-five years."8 Since its initial development in the 1960s, 9
Norplant has been used by more than one million women in nineteen
countries. 20
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Why Isn't Our Birth Control Better?, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 52. The
American abortion rate is one of the highest in the developed world-Il.6 million per year. Id.
Also, Europe has a much larger variety of contraceptive techniques available to the public,
including the revolutionary RU-486, which is a postcoital contraceptive. Id. at 53.
Some researchers feel the disparity in reproductive technology is partly due to anti-abortion
movements. Jeannie Rosoff, president of the Alan Guttmacher Institute, states: "A lot of the
controversy about abortion has spilled over to development of new contraceptives .... [I]t's
had a chilling effect on funding and undertaking in this area." Hodges, supra at * 1. Douglas
Johnson, legislative director at the National Right to Life Committee, on the other hand, feels
that the prolife movement has not inhibited contraception development. Id. Nevertheless,
reports estimate that 1.5 million abortions are performed each year in the United States as a
result of failed contraception. Id. In addition, 3.4 million pregnancies carried to term in
America are unplanned. Elmer-Dewitt, supra at 52.
Others feel the United States' lag is a result of manufacturers' fears of litigation as a result of
failed contraceptives. For example, A.H. Robins Co., the producer of the defective Dalkon
Shield, a form of IUD, faced over 100,000 claims from dissatisfied and injured users. Hodges,
supra at *2. The company claimed bankruptcy after setting up a $2.47 billion trust fund to pay
the claims. Id.
15. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 128-51.
17. See William Booth, Updating a Revolution: 5-Year Birth Control Implant Offers Reli-
ability, but with Side Effects, WASH. PosT, Jan. 7, 1991, at A3 (discussing various characteris-
tics of the drug).
18. Id.
19. The drug was originally developed by Sheldon Segal of the Population Council's labo-
ratories at Rockefeller University. Id.
20. Fawn Vrazo, Implant Gets Few Takers: Norplant Finds Slow Acceptance, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, June 17, 1991, at I-A, 8-A. In countries like China, where overpopulation threatens
future generations, Norplant is being more readily welcomed. The United Nations Population
Fund is currently building a plant in China to manufacture Norplant that will be used to
control the "population bulge," which is expected to surge to 15 million newborns each year.
Ramon Isberto, Population: China Faces Aging Problem on Top of Baby Boom, Inter Press
Serv., May 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Serv. File.
Norplant
The use of Norplant entails the insertion of six small silicone tubes, each
the size of a matchstick, under the skin of a woman's upper arm.2' The
tubes release the hormones nomegestol acetate and levonorgestrel,22 which
cause the cervical mucus in the uterus to remain thick thereby suppressing
ovulation and inhibiting fertilization.23 These hormones are effective within
twenty-four hours after implantation 24 and are steadily released over a five
year period so long as the tubes remain implanted." The insertion or re-
moval of the tubes takes approximately ten to fifteen minutes each2 6 and,
according to a study conducted by Philip Darney at San Francisco General
Hospital, involves little or no pain.27 Only one out of five women in the
study reported that someone had noticed the implantation in their arm after
the surgery was completed.2" Although Norplant has proven extremely ef-
fective with a very low failure rate," there are side effects, such as head-
aches, depression, nausea, dizziness, acne, hirsutism, tenderness of the
breast, and irregular bleeding. a A notable advantage to Norplant, however,
21. Booth, supra note 17, at A3. Researchers have tested implantations at other locations
on the woman's body, for example, the buttocks and the forearm. Due to migration of the
tubes or greater visibility in either location, the drug is best inserted under the skin of the
upper arm. Id
22. See FDA Approves Brazilian Contraceptive Drug Implant, Pharmaceutical Bus. News,
Jan. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pharmaceutical Bus. News File; Booth, supra
note 17, at A3; Gelernter, supra note 6, at 7.
23. "The combination of suppressed ovulation and sticky mucus results in Norplant's ex-
tremely low failure rate in preventing contraception." Booth, supra note 17, at A3. Neverthe-
less, researchers estimate that during the first year of use, 11% of all women still ovulate, and
that by the fifth year, one-half of all Norplant users will ovulate. Id.
24. Gelernter, supra note 6, at 7. The implantation must take place within the first week
of the menstrual cycle. Id.
25. Booth, supra note 17, at A3.
26. Gelernter, supra note 6, at 7. Removal of the tubes may sometimes be more compli-
cated because tissue may begin to grow around the tubes and may have to be cut away before
the tubes are removed. Id.
27. Booth, supra note 17, at A3.
28. Id.
29. See supra note 23. Researchers also estimate that Norplant may be most effective for
women who weigh under 150-155 pounds. Booth, supra note 17, at A3; Gelernter, supra note
6, at 7. Some researchers estimate that four percent of all women, regardless of weight, may
become pregnant during a five year period of Norplant implantation. Booth, supra note 17, at
A3. The overall success rate of Norplant is said to be 99.8%. Appraising New Birth Control,
CHi. TRIa., Jan. 20, 1991, § 6, at 7. Compared to other forms of birth control, Norplant has
the highest rate of effectiveness; the rates of other forms include: tubal ligation-99.6%;
IUD-99.2%; oral contraceptives-97.0%; condom-88.0%; diaphragm-82.0%; and vagi-
nal sponge-72.0%. Rubin, supra note 6, at B4.
30. Appraising New Birth Control, supra note 29, at 7; Booth supra note 17, at A3. In
some instances women will experience a complete cessation of menstruation. Appraising New
Birth Control, supra note 29, at 7. In one trial study, 15% of the women who tried Norplant
had to have it removed due to irregular bleeding. Rubin, supra note 6, at B4. Other reports
1992]
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is that it contains no estrogen, the chemical compound found in oral contra-
ceptives, which is said to cause various side effects, including cancer."a
Another criticism of Norplant is its cost and availability to indigent wo-
men.32 The cost of the Norplant device and the procedure is between $350
and $600. 33 Wyeth-Ayerst, the manufacturer of Norplant, reports that
forty-three states have offered to absorb the cost of implanting the device
through respective Medicaid programs.34 However, for most women who
are not covered under Medicaid, the procedure is unavailable. A special
foundation has been established with $2.8 million in Wyeth-Ayerst funds to
help women pay for Norplant; however, as of June 1991 the foundation had
awarded no money.35
In an effort to alleviate the cost of Norplant, Kerry Patrick, State Repre-
sentative of Kansas (Rep.), introduced a bill proposing financial incentives to
women who use Norplant.36 The bill was rejected by a 77-27 vote, however,
and was seen by some as a coercive attempt to manipulate the underprivi-
leged populations.37 Former Louisiana State Representative David Duke
(Rep.) introduced a similar proposal, which would give $100 per year to
estimate this figure to be at 20%. Jennifer J. Bush, Orange County Focus: Countywide; 4
Doctors Trained in Contraceptive Use, L.A. TIMES (Orange County), Mar. 21, 1991, at B3.
Approximately six percent of the women participating in the study experienced some form of
complication during removal. Id.
31. Rubin, supra note 6, at B4. According to recent reports, a positive effect of daily
doses of estrogen is that they may minimize the risks of heart disease and other diseases like
osteoporosis. Fawn Vrazo, Stunning Benefits of Estrogen Shown, but Doubts Persist, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 22, 1991, at 1-C, 2-C. Additionally, scientists have discovered, through re-
search outside of the reproductive field involving laboratory mice, that the chemicals used in
Norplant may be effective in helping women who suffer from Lupus, an auto-immune disease.
Ron Kotulak & John Van, Hormone Could Help Women with Lupus, CHII. TRIB., Apr. 7, 1991,
§ 5, at 4.
32. Linda R. Monroe, New Expensive Birth Control Implant Gets Slow Acceptance, L.A.
TIMES (San Diego County), May 16, 1991, at B1; Vrazo, supra note 20, at I-A (explaining why
the use of Norplant is off to a slow start in the U.S.).
33. Booth, supra note 17, at A3.
34. Vrazo, supra note 20, at 8-A. Nelson Sabatini, the state health secretary of Maryland,
for example, estimates that "at least 110,000 Maryland women of child-bearing age might be
eligible for Medicaid reimbursement for Norplant." State to Use Medicaid to Pay for Norplant,
UPI, Mar. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. As of August 1, 1991,
Medicaid will cover the cost of both the device and the surgical procedure to have it implanted
or removed. Medicaid to Pay for Norplant Contraceptive, UPI, July 11, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
35. Vrazo, supra note 20, at 8-A; see also WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1991, at A8.
36. The incentive would pay an initial $500 to welfare mothers to have Norplant im-
planted, plus $50 per month for its continued use. Jason DeParle, The Nation: As Funds for
Welfare Shrink, Ideas Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991, at E5.
37. See id.
Norplant
women on welfare who already have one child and choose to use Norplant.38
Shortly after its introduction, the bill was amended to include a $100 per
month incentive.39 Opponents of these and similar legislative responses to
Norplant claim that if not enough welfare mothers accept the incentives and
use Norplant, the proposals may actually cost the state money.' This fear is
generated by the fact that Norplant has not been as widely accepted as origi-
nally expected.4" Despite its unpredictable start, however, economic ana-
lysts estimate that if the drug does meet its expected goal, sales could
approach $85 million by the mid-1990s, and as high as $200 million
annually.4 2
The accessibility of Norplant to sexually active teenagers4 3 has also been
criticized." Although the use of Norplant will reduce the number of teen-
age pregnancies, some commentators suggest that this successful form of
birth control will lull teenagers into a false sense of security and merely pro-
mote more sexual activity.4" This is especially harmful because Norplant
does nothing to curb sexually transmitted diseases, which continue to in-
crease in number.4 6 In effect, the added sense of protection against preg-
nancy may actually be an added risk. Consequently, the technical qualities
of Norplant are no longer at issue, but rather the question is who should use
it.
B. Legal Implications
Since its introduction to the market in December 1990, Norplant has
38. Maralee Schwartz, Duke Presses Louisiana Birth Control, WASH. POST, May 29, 1991,
at A14.
39. Id. The cash incentives were ultimately removed from the bill, leaving education as
the only means of encouraging welfare mothers to use birth control. See id.
40. C.J. Fogel, Duke Bill for Welfare Moms Clears Louisiana House Panel, Gannett News
Serv., May 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gannett News Serv. File.
41. See generally Vrazo, supra note 20, at 1-A (offering costs, side effects, and lack of
insurance coverage as reasons for the initial slow acceptance of Norplant).
42. Christine Shenot, Norplant Getting Off to an Uncertain Start, INVESTOR'S DAILY,
June 18, 1991, at HCI. Some analysts are unsure of the financial future of Norplant because of
unlikely insurance coverage, unproven long-term effects, and the unpredictable effect the drug
will have on sales of competitors' oral contraceptives. See id.
43. Planned Parenthood, for example, will offer Norplant to teenagers without parental
consent, as it does with other forms of birth control. Kim Painter, Minors Won't Need Consent
for Norplant, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1991, at IA. However, most teenagers have not accepted
Norplant because of the possibility of variant side effects and the fact that the implantation can
not be completely concealed from parents. See Vrazo, supra note 20, at 8-A.
44. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 43, at IA (criticizing Planned Parenthood for disregard-
ing parental authority).
45. Ultimate Protection, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1991, at B5 (citing statement by Tom Min-
nery, vice president of a national family counseling organization).
46. Id.
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aroused heated discussion as to the appropriateness of its use. "A lot of
people have given up on social policy, on taking care of poor women, and
there is an increasing undercurrent that since we don't really know what to
do about crack addicts, people with AIDS[,] and child abusers, we should
stop them from having kids." '4 7 The three major controversies stirring
within the social and legal fields are the coercive use of Norplant as a means
of controlling the minority populations,4" the court-ordered implantation of
Norplant in drug-addicted women,49 and the mandatory use of Norplant for
convicted child abusers.50
On December 12, 1990, the Philadelphia Inquirer published an editorial
that ignited a national controversy over the appropriate use of Norplant. 51
The editorial suggested that in order to curb the growing poverty among
welfare recipients, mothers on welfare should be offered incentives to use
Norplant.52 However, so many readers found the editorial racially tainted53
that the paper renounced the column and published an apology.54 The de-
velopers of Norplant, including Dr. Sheldon Segal, anticipated and feared
47. Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews Debate Over Forced Contracep-
tion, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20 (quoting Dr. George Annas, Director of the program
on law, medicine, and ethics at the Boston University School of Medicine).
48. See Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass?, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at 18-A [hereinafter Poverty and Norplant].
49. See generally George P. Smith, II, Fetal Abuse: Culpable Behavior by Pregnant Wo-
men or Parental Immunity?, 3 J.L. & HEALTH 223 (1988-89) (discussing options for courts in
sentencing women convicted of child abuse through drug addiction). Sixty percent of the peo-
ple polled in California support the mandatory use of Norplant for drug abusers. Tim Rutten,
Norplanting or Supplanting Private Rights, L.A. TIMEs, May 31, 1991, at El, E5; George Skel-
ton & Daniel M. Weintraub, Most Support Norplantfor Teens, Drug Addicts, L.A. TIMES, May
27, 1991, at Al.
50. See Michael T. Flannery, Court-Ordered Prenatal Intervention: A Final Means to the
End of Gestational Substance Abuse, 30 J. FAM. L. (forthcoming 1992) (discussing the use of
Norplant as a preventive tool for child abuse). But see Colleen M. Coyle, Comment, Steriliza-
tion: A "Remedy for the Malady" of Child Abuse?, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245,
261-62 (1989) (suggesting that sterilization is ineffective as a solution to the problem of child
abuse).
51. Poverty and Norplant, supra note 48, at 18-A.
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., Rita C. Baldwin, Norplant Editorial Exhibited "Classic Racism," PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 1990, at 16-A (challenging the motives behind the editorial as examples of
racism and classism); Vanessa Williams, Seriously Flawed, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 1990, at
16-A (criticizing the editorial's contribution to racial polarization by irresponsibly handling an
extreme social problem).
54. An Apology: The Editorial on 'Norplant and Poverty' Was Misguided and Wrong-
headed, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 1990, at 4-C. The article stated in part:
We realize now that we hastily and foolishly juxtaposed two news items that ap-
peared in The Inquirer the previous day-federal approval of the long-term contra-
ceptive Norplant and the release of a research group's report that said nearly half of
black children are living in poverty and that the situation is getting worse with time.
Norplant
such coercive use of the drug by governments;55 however, "frankly, they
were worrying about China, not California."'56 Dr. Segal states that "[a]ny
coercive purpose ... is a gross misuse of the method," ' and that the line
between incentive and coercion becomes gray especially "when you single
out a welfare mother, wave a $500 bill in front of her face and say that the
government is going to induce you not to have children."5" However, Don-
ald Kimelman, the author of the controversial editorial in the Philadelphia
newspaper, responds that the suggestion of such a use was in no way coer-
cive, but rather rehabilitative. He writes,
If Norplant could significantly reduce the number of children born
into the bleakest possible circumstances, wouldn't society be better
off? And wouldn't the mothers have a better chance of organizing
their lives to escape poverty?
Improved contraception cannot win the war on poverty. But
shouldn't it be an important weapon in the arsenal?5 9
When narrowly directed toward the issue of incentives for welfare recipi-
ents, the editor's reasoning is logical and legally valid-provided that the
submission to the implantation is voluntary and done for rehabilitative pur-
poses. First, notwithstanding any racial undertones that may be inferred
from offering financial incentives, the idea of stimulating an anticipated re-
sponse is not foreign to the democratic ideology, nor does it affront moral
integrity per se. Commenting on the use of incentives, Dr. Segal states that,
"[iut's the way we get people to join the army, buy a Chevrolet, give to char-
ity."' Thus, the mere offering of an incentive to stimulate the use of Nor-
The editorial posed the question of whether encouraging women who are on welfare
to use Norplant could help reverse this bleak trend ....
[I]n linking the issues of race and contraception, we left too many people with the
impression that our cure for poverty was to reduce the number of black people.
Id. See also David R. Boldt, A Conference on Political Correctness Forces a Revisiting of Nor-
plant, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 1991, at 5-C (commenting on the role of the press in stimu-
lating and disseminating politically sensitive commentary); David R. Boldt, A "Racist Pig"
Offers Some Final Thoughts on Norplant, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 30, 1990, at 7-F (offering the
editor's view of the controversial Norplant editorial).
55. For a commentary on how the Indonesian government, in an effort to control over-
population, conducts "safaris" to recruit native women to submit to the implantation of Nor-
plant, see Arthur Caplan, Birth-Control Implant Leads to Population Control by Governments,
SEATrLE TIMES, July 7, 1991, at A13.
56. Ellen Goodman, Norplant: Birth Control-Or Woman Control?, Newsday, Feb. 19,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsday File.
57. Don Williamson, Norplant: Forced Surgery Is No Answer, SEATrLE TIMEs, June 27,
1991, at A12.
58. Goodman, supra note 56, at *2 (quoting Dr. Sheldon Segal).
59. Donald Kimelman, The Norplant Editorial Writer Responds, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,
1991, at D6.
60. Goodman, supra note 56, at *2.
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plant is by no means coercive per se. Second, because the incentives are not
focused on specific minority groups, particularly blacks or hispanics, but
rather on all welfare recipients, then they are presumptively nondiscrimina-
tory. Third, neither the Norplant implantation nor the incentives are forced
upon any member of the recipient class. Each member may weigh the of-
fered incentives against any collateral effects of using Norplant, thereby
making a voluntary decision to use Norplant. Provided the incentives of-
fered to all welfare recipients are noncoercive and allow for voluntary deci-
sions, they are valid.
The second controversy ignited by Norplant is whether it should be used
in an effort to reduce the high rate of mothers giving birth to drug-addicted
newborns. 61 As more courts acknowledge the impact that drugs and alcohol
have on the fetus, factors affecting childbearing and reproductive freedoms
will take on greater significance in decisions regarding sentencing. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Denoncourt, the court considered whether there
should be an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines for a
nineteen-year-old pregnant woman convicted of illegally entering the United
States following deportation, and stated its concern that the defendant may
abuse drugs or engage in prostitution while pregnant.62 The court found
that "in sentencing, the rights and interests of the unborn baby should be
considered along with those of his or her mother.",63 As a result, it is fore-
seeable that courts will take an active role to intervene on behalf of unborn
children. Arthur Caplan, director of the University of Minnesota's Center
for Biomedical Ethics, states, "There's definitely a trend toward third-party
involvement in reproductive decisions, including all the attempts to put wo-
men in jail for taking drugs that can affect the fetus.""6 Dr. George Annas
agrees, commenting that, "Norplant presents a special temptation to judges
because it's so long lasting and doesn't require any cooperation after it's im-
planted, and can be monitored by a parole officer just by looking at the wo-
man's arm .... I think we're going to see more of these cases."
61
61. See, e.g., Christy Scattarella, Forced Birth Control: Drug-Baby Boom Sparks Callfor
Implants for Addicts, SEATrLE TIMEs, June 24, 1991, at Al (questioning whether a mother
who has given birth to ten drug-addicted babies should have the device surgically implanted).
For a statistical summary of drug-addicted newborns, see Flannery, supra note 50.
62. United States v. Denoncourt, 751 F. Supp. 168, 170 (D. Haw. 1990).
63. Id.
64. Lewin, supra note 47, at A20.
65. Id. The difficulty of policing compliance with the use of other forms of birth control
was a concern in the case of People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984). In Pointer,
Dr. Barbara 0. Murray states, "[I]f required to take birth control pills, for example, it ...
would be extremely difficult to monitor or supervise such a condition, and the likelihood of
noncompliance would be inordinately high." Id. at 362.
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Closely related to this is the third issue involving mandatory implantation
of Norplant for convicted child abusers66 in an effort to reduce the genera-
tional recidivism of child abuse. Advocates of mandatory implantation seek
to avoid scenarios such as the one experienced by Ruby Pointer. In 1981,
authorities in California placed two of Pointer's children in foster care.67
The children, one of whom was found semicomatose and weighed only eight
pounds, suffered from severe malnutrition. 68 A Santa Cruz Superior Court
judge subsequently held that Pointer would be prohibited from having chil-
dren for five years.69 However, the California Court of Appeal for the First
District found the order overly broad and Pointer was thereafter free to bear
children.7° Unfortunately, within ten years after the order was reversed,
Pointer had given birth to three more children who, in June 1991, were se-
verely neglected-found hiding in piles of garbage and urine inside Pointer's
apartment.7 '
It logically follows that a prohibition on childbearing would have pre-
vented further abuse and suffering. On the other hand, some argue that such
cases are a result of a failed social service system.72 Perhaps most agree that
both explanations are accurate: "The system isn't designed to help the kids
as much as it should because there are so many concerns over parents'
rights.",73 Nevertheless, as more and more cases like Ruby Pointer's con-
tinue to overburden the social service system and child abusers and drug-
66. Most commentators see maternal substance abuse as one form of child abuse. See
generally Flannery, supra note 50 (theorizing that gestational substance abuse is a form of
child abuse-subject to the same reporting requirements and abuse and neglect laws as other
forms of child abuse).
67. Paul Rogers, Calif Suspect Was Once Ordered Not to Have Children, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, June 23, 1991, at 4-A.
68. See id. The mother, Ruby Pointer, adhered to a strict macrobiotic diet that caused the
malnutrition in the children. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 359 (Ct. App. 1984).
"Macrobiotic, as it's usually used, refers to a diet that is pretty much exclusively grains,
beans[,] and vegetables, meaning pretty much excluding fruits, deemphasizing salads, deem-
phasizing or eliminating milk products of all form, yogurt, milk, cheese, cottage cheese[,] and,
also, no fish, meat, poultry, or eggs ...." Id. at 359 n.2 (quoting appellant's physician).
69. Rogers, supra note 67, at 4-A. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated,
I have never considered imposing as a condition of probation the requirement that
someone not conceive during the period of probation, and I have never considered
requiring as a condition of probation that a defendant not have custody of her chil-
dren without approval by the sentencing court following a hearing, but that's cer-
tainly what I intend to do in this case. This is an extremely serious case.
Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
70. See id. at 366.
71. Rogers, supra note 67, at 4-A.
72. See generally Coyle, supra note 50 (arguing that the failing child protective system is
stimulating interest in the rejuvenation of sterilization legislation).
73. Rogers, supra note 67, at 4-A (quoting Deputy Police Chief Mike Dunbaugh).
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addicted mothers abuse their rights and responsibilities as parents, courts
will continue to consider preventive measures such as mandatory steriliza-
tion and temporary childbearing prohibitions as viable options in sentencing.
Some commentators view sterilization, and therefore Norplant, as a
means of reducing the growing surge of child abuse.74 These proponents
mandate sterilization despite lack of consent on the part of the convicted
recipient." Other commentators advocate that,
when treatment has been offered and rejected-or failed-or when
a convicted drug user continues to get pregnant, she should be of-
fered a choice .... The judge could say, "Every time we turn our
backs, you're having more drug babies. Your choice is not to let
you have any more kids for a while or to put you in jail."76
Still others oppose even voluntary sterilization, arguing that sterilization is a
punitive measure and does not cure the deep-rooted psychological problems
inherent in child abusers and child abuse victims. 7
Recently, a California Superior Court judge was confronted with the child
abuse dilemma. Less than one month after the Food and Drug Administra-
tion approved Norplant, Tulare County Superior Court Judge Howard
Broadman sentenced twenty-seven year-old Darlene Johnson to undergo im-
plantation as a result of her child abuse conviction.78 Originally Johnson
74. See Smith, supra note 49, at 234; see also Flannery, supra note 50 (offering Norplant as
one option for courts to consider in dealing with mothers who repeatedly give birth to drug-
addicted infants).
California Governor Pete Wilson is presently considering making Norplant mandatory for
women of childbearing age who abuse drugs. Although he is unsure whether such a plan will
take effect, he is concerned that all teenagers and drug addicted women who want Norplant
are unable to receive it. Consequently, Governor Wilson has proposed adding $10 million to
the budget of the Office of Family Planning in order to obtain Norplant kits. Daniel M. Wein-
traub & George Skelton, Wilson Favors Use of Birth Control Implant: Family Planning: Gov-
ernor Hopes to Make Norplant Device Widely Available to Teen-Agers and Drug Users, L.A.
TIMES, May 17, 1991, at Al.
75. See generally Smith, supra note 49, at 234. Professor Smith states,
More serious consideration should be given to sterilizing those women who prove
themselves to be repeated child abusers through drug addiction and other willful
acts. Just as a conviction for statutory rape has brought, in lieu of sentencing, an
agreed sterilization, courts should act (with or without personal agreement or acqui-
escence) to prevent continued tragedies of birth where egregious cases of maternal
negligence or culpable behavior have clearly shown that a woman is not deserving of
the dignity and moral recognition of a true mother.
Id. (citations omitted).
76. Scattarella, supra note 61, at A4 (quoting Daniel Polsby, law professor at Northwest-
ern University); see also The Norplant Dilemma: Encourage, Don't Force, Use of New Birth
Control, SEATrLE TIMES, July 7, 1991, at A14 (arguing that the use of Norplant should be a
matter of choice, not a legal mandate).
77. See Coyle, supra note 50, at 261-62.
78. In re Johnson, No. 29-390 (Tulare County Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 2, 1991) appeal dis-
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agreed to the implantation but has since changed her mind,79 thus question-
ing whether courts can constitutionally intrude into the area of women's
rights regarding reproductive freedom.80
Darlene Johnson may criticize the decision because she is not medically
suited for the implantation of Norplant. The drug has proven inappropriate
for women who suffer from heart or liver disease, diabetes, or blood deficien-
cies;"1 Johnson suffers from diabetes, a heart murmur, and high blood pres-
sure. 2 However, despite the fact that Johnson and other women with
similar medical problems are not suited for Norplant, this does not detract
from the validity of Norplant as an option for the courts.
missed (5th Cir. 1992). At the time of sentencing, Darlene Johnson had four children and was
pregnant with her fifth child. Moss, supra note 10, at 2A. She was found guilty of beating her
children with a belt and an extension cord. Judge: Birth Control Order Stands, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 11, 1991, § 1, at 9 [hereinafter Order Stands]. In addition to the implantation of Nor-
plant, Johnson's sentence included one year in jail and three years of probation. William
Booth, Judge Orders Birth Control Implant in Defendant, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1991, at Al.
Judge Broadman also ordered her to quit smoking during her pregnancy, stating, "If you can't
quit smoking for the betterment of your baby, how are you ever going to get your act together
not to beat your children?" Order Stands, supra at 9.
Approximately two months after making his decision, Judge Broadman was shot at in his
courtroom by Harry Bodine, who admitted that he was angry over Broadman's Norplant deci-
sion. Man Is Arraigned in Court Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A22. Only two days
after the shooting, Judge Broadman filed a civil suit against Bodine for mental and physical
suffering that resulted from the incident. Judge Who Was Shot at in Courtroom Files Suit
Against Alleged Assailant, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at A23. Judge Broadman later removed
himself from the case, stating, "Due to the local, national, even international attention associ-
ated with me and this case-and my attempted assassination because of it-I am disqualifying
myself from this case and will make no further rulings." Controversial Judge Steps Aside,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 15, 1991, at A6.
79. Since the decision, the attorney general's office has stipulated that Darlene Johnson
did not voluntarily agree to the implantation and has asked that the case be remanded to
Superior Court for a new sentence. See Gene Garaygordobil, Prosecutors Side with Defendant
in Norplant Case, Gannett News Serv., June 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gan-
nett News Serv. File. Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal at the
request of Johnson's lawyers after Johnson violated the terms of her probation by testing posi-
tive for drug use which resulted in a five year prison sentence and rendered the Norplant issue
moot. Birth Curb Order is Declared Moot, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A7.
80. Judge Broadman defends the constitutionality of his decision because the state has a
compelling interest in the protection of children. Lev, supra note 10, at A17.
[T]he order was "reasonably related to the compelling state interest, public safety
and rehabilitation." Although the right to procreate is substantial and constitution-
ally protected, "it is not absolute and can be limited in a proper case." . .. The
compelling state interest in the protection of the children of the state ... supersedes
this particular individual's right to procreate and does not interfere with her right of
sexual expression.
Id. (quoting Judge Broadman).
81. See Gelernter, supra note 6, at 7.
82. Lev, supra note 10, at A17.
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Other arguments available to Johnson and any other defendant facing
mandatory imposition of Norplant may involve constitutional considera-
tions, including equal protection and due process. However, before these
issues arise in a court of law, there must first be a standard by which a court
determines whether the imposition of Norplant is appropriate for any given
defendant. This standard must consider the conduct for which the defend-
ant has been convicted and the effectiveness of sterilization in preventing
similar conduct in the future.
II. PROSPECTIVE ABUSE STANDARD
The mandatory imposition of birth control or sterilization may be equated
with the termination of parental rights because the mother is denied the op-
portunity to be a parent.8 3 However, by imposing Norplant, courts are not
terminating parental rights in already existing children, but in future chil-
dren. To constitutionally terminate these rights, the courts must find pro-
spective abuse or neglect.a4 When mothers repeatedly give birth to drug-
83. See Motes v. Hall County Dep't of Family and Children Servs., 306 S.E.2d 260, 261
(Ga. 1983) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to authorize involuntary sterilization).
84. Most states that have addressed the concept of prospective abuse have done so statuto-
rily. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.464 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991), which allows the depart-
ment, the guardian ad litem, or a licensed child-placing agency to petition for the termination
of parental rights for several reasons including: "[s]evere or continuing abuse or neglect.-The
parent or parents have engaged in conduct towards the child or towards other children that
demonstrates that the continuing involvement... in the parent-child relationship threatens the
life or well-being of the child regardless of the provision of services."
Florida defines abuse as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury
that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be signifi-
cantly impaired." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2). However, at least eighteen state courts have
addressed the issue of prospective abuse, including Alabama-see, e.g., In re Sanders, 420 So.
2d 790 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (terminating father's rights to four minor children when father
had been abusive to only two of the children); Colorado-see, e.g., In re C.R., 557 P.2d 1225
(Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that it could reasonably be inferred that the nonabused child
lacked proper parental care from evidence that established mistreatment of others); Florida-
see, e.g., In re Baby Boy A, 544 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (terminating father's
parental rights and permanently committing child for adoption when evidence of prospective
abuse and neglect of child was established); Georgia-see, e.g., In re A.T., 370 S.E.2d 48 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that continuous neglect and parental misconduct of one child was
detrimental and egregious enough to terminate rights in older child who was not subject to
that abuse); Illinois-see, e.g., In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that
when evidence establishes an injurious environment, court should not wait until each child
becomes a victim of abuse before taking action); In re J.R., 473 N.E.2d 1009 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (holding that abusive events occurring prior to birth of some children could serve as
basis for terminating parental rights in other children); In re Brooks, 379 N.E.2d 872 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978) (holding that children could be adjudicated wards of the court despite lack of evi-
dence of neglect or abuse towards them due to physical abuse of two other children); Iowa-
see, e.g., In re W.G., 349 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1984) (holding that the district court's termina-
tion of parental rights was justified on the basis of past and probable future abuse of seven
Norplant
addicted babies or abuse or neglect their children, a court may impose Nor-
plant if it shows that Norplant is necessary to avoid similar occurrences in
the future. The question remains: By what standard must this be proven?
The only possible standards are those used by courts to terminate parental
rights in already existing children.
In Lassiter v. Department of Social &rvices," 5 the Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
that counsel be appointed for indigent parents in every parental rights termi-
nation proceeding. 6 This holding led to further questioning of the scope of
the rights afforded natural parents under the Due Process Clause. One year
after Lassiter, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of terminating
children), cert. denied sub nor. J.G. v. Tauke, 469 U.S. 1222 (1985); Louisiana-see, e.g.,
Louisiana v. Young, 342 So. 2d 1205 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that five children were
neglected in light of unsanitary and unwholesome living conditions). But
see Louisiana ex rel. CAB v. EB, 504 So. 2d 162 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that court
improperly terminated mother's parental rights to daughters when evidence showed mother's
abuse of son and only father's sexual abuse of daughters); Massachusetts-see, e.g., In re Cus-
tody of Two Minors, 487 N.E.2d 1358, 1366 (Mass. 1986) (holding that the trial court may
"assess prognostic evidence derived from prior patterns of parental neglect or misconduct in
determining future fitness and likelihood of harm to the child"); Michigan--see, e.g., In re
LaFlure, 210 N.W.2d 482 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that mistreatment of one child is
probative of how the parents may treat other children); Minnesota-see, e.g., In re J.L.L., 396
N.W.2d 647 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (considering the father's likelihood of future abuse as a
factor in terminating parental rights in child); In re B.C., 356 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (upholding the termination of mother's parental rights to son on ground that she had
physically abused and murdered another child); Missouri-see, e.g., In re R.A.M., 755 S.W.2d
431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that abuse of one child may justify termination of parental
rights with respect to both victim and other siblings); K.S. v. M.N.W., 713 S.W.2d 858 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (terminating parental rights in siblings of abused child even though siblings
receives no serious injuries); Montana-see e.g., In re T.Y.K., 598 P.2d 593 (Mont. 1979)
(removing all three children from the parents because of physical injuries sustained by only
one child); Nebraska-see, e.g., In re S.L.P., 432 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Neb. 1988) (stating that "a
court need not await certain disaster to come into fruition before taking protective steps in the
interest of a minor child"); New Mexico--see, e.g., In re I.N.M., 735 P.2d 1170 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1987) (terminating parental rights in younger child when evidence demonstrated severe
abuse to older child); New York-see, e.g., In re Cruz, 503 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986) (finding the court cannot and should not "await broken bone or shattered psyche before
extending its protective cloak around a child ....") (citation omitted); Pennsylvania--see,
e.g., In re Black, 417 A.2d 1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (declaring newborn infant "deprived"
based on evidence of prior deaths of two children as a result of parents' improper care); South
Dakota-see, e.g., In re K.D.E., 210 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1973) (ordering both a boy and girl be
removed from the parents when only the boy was tied to a bed, beaten, and caged in a base-
ment); and Texas-see, e.g., Zeigler v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 680 S.W.2d 674
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (terminating parental rights in all five children when mother directed
abuse toward only one son in the presence of the other children).
85. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
86. Id. at 25-27.
19921
216 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:201
the rights of natural parents87 when it questioned a New York law that al-
lowed for the termination of parental rights upon a finding that the child is
"permanently neglected."'8'  The applicable standard of proof to support
such a finding required only a "fair preponderance of the evidence" under
Article 10 of the Family Court Act.89 The Court concluded that, "the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than this.
Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in
their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations
by at least clear and convincing evidence. ' 9°
Many states have held that proof of prospective abuse in cases of child
abuse and neglect must be clear and convincing despite a lack of physical
evidence.9 Recently, in In re Palmer,92 the clear and convincing standard
was not met. In that case, a one-year-old child was "adjudicated dependent"
and ordered to remain in the custody of his maternal grandmother after his
stepsister died under suspicious circumstances. 93 The boy's father was ar-
rested and charged with the death of the girl. 94 The child's mother argued
that because there was no evidence that she was unfit to care for the boy and
she would not allow the father to live with the boy after the father's incarcer-
ation, there was no longer a threat to her son.95 The appellate court reversed
the dependency adjudication and held that a finding of dependency could
not be justified solely on the basis of the daughter's death when there was no
evidence that the mother knew of the danger to the daughter.96 The Palmer
case demonstrates the difficulty and frustration in reaching the clear and
convincing standard to find that prospective abuse exists. If courts are to
constructively terminate parental rights through the use of Norplant, any
prospective abuse or neglect must be clearly and convincingly shown before
the fundamental rights of the parent are extinguished. Some state steriliza-
tion statutes expressly require a clear and convincing standard before such a
procedure can be authorized.97 If such a standard is met, Norplant may be
87. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
88. N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 384-b.4(d) (McKinney 1983).
89. 1976 N.Y. LAWS 666.
90. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.
91. See supra note 84.
92. 590 A.2d 798 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
93. Id. at 799.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 801.
96. Id. at 802.
97. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-699(b) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring the
court to give its consent to sterilization only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that
such an operation or procedure is in the individual's best interest); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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compelled in cases of repeated gestational substance abuse or child abuse if
sterilization or mandatory birth control is a factor considered in sentencing.
III. STERILIZATION AS A CONDITION IN SENTENCING
Once a court considers using Norplant as part of a sentence, it is then
faced with the issue of how the implantation will be imposed-mandatorily
or voluntarily. In making this determination, not only must the court weigh
the benefits of each but also the constitutional limitations of the First,9"
Eighth,99 and Fourteenthl °° Amendments.
A. Mandatory Sterilization
The idea of sterilizing convicted criminals is not as new to the courts as is
Norplant. In fact, the issue was raised almost a century ago in Davis v.
Berry,10 which held unconstitutional a state law requiring a vasectomy to be
performed on all criminals who were twice convicted of a felony."0 2 The
state law violated the Eighth Amendment because it subjected the defendant
to cruel and unusual punishment.'0 3 In making this finding, the court com-
pared the vasectomy procedure with castration and reasoned that the perma-
nent effects of the operations make them cruel and unusual."°4
There is a difference between the operation of castration and vasec-
tomy: castration being physically more severe than the other. But
vasectomy in its results is much the coarser and more vulgar. But
the purpose and result of the two operations are one and the same.
... [E]ach operation is to destroy the power of procreation. It is,
of course, to follow the man during the balance of his life. The
physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not the only test
of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the mental
suffering are always present and known by all the public, and will
§ 744.3725(5) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is
in the best interest of the recipient).
98. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
100. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 states in pertinent part: "No State shall... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
101. 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1914). At that
time, the law authorized "a surgical operation called vasectomy on idiots, feeble-minded,
drunkards, drug fiends, epileptics, syphilitics, moral and sexual perverts, and ... criminals
who [were] twice convicted of a felony." Id. at 414.
102. Id. at 419.
103. Id. at 417.
104. Id. at 416.
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follow him wheresoever he may go. This belongs to the Dark
Ages. 105
Likewise, in Mickle v. Henrichs,"°6 a mandatory sterilization procedure
for a convicted rapist was found to be cruel and unusual punishment despite
the fact that it could be performed without physical pain or suffering.'l 7 In
Mickle and Davis, the degradation and humiliation that accompanies the
procedures were found to be unjust. 0 8
Some state statutes address the technical aspects of the specific steriliza-
tion procedure in determining whether it is in the best interest of the recipi-
ent. In Hawaii, for example, the court considers:
(4) the feasibility and medical advisability of less restrictive al-
ternatives to sterilization both at the present time and under fore-
seeable future circumstances;
(5) whether scientific or medical advances may occur within
the foreseeable future which will make possible the improvement of
the ward's condition or result in less drastic contraceptive
measures. 109
However, the humiliating and degrading factors in Davis and Mickle and the
medical advances addressed in more recent statutes are avoided with the use
of Norplant. Because the procedure is painless, inconspicuous, and revers-
ible, claims of cruel and unusual punishment are not persuasive in the age of
Norplant.
The onset of mandatory sterilization debates arose during a surge in the
eugenic movement" 0  beginning in the early twentieth century. The
Supreme Court contributed to these debates when it held in Buck v. Bell...
that the sterilization of institutional inmates who suffer from hereditary
forms of insanity or imbecility is valid under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 2
Distinguishing Buck, the Supreme Court later struck down an Oklahoma
105. Id.
106. 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918).
107. Id. at 690. But see State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912) (requiring actual physical
pain for cruel and unusual punishment and affirming a vasectomy order for defendant because
the procedure was simple and painless).
108. See Mickle, 262 F. at 690-91; Davis, 216 F. at 417.
109. HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-608(c) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
110. The eugenic movement was an effort to control the reproductivity of the socially inept
and mentally or criminally deficient, who were believed to have genetically acquired their
given predispositions. For a brief history of the eugenic movement, see Julie Marcus, Com-
ment, In re Romero: Sterilization and Competency, 68 DEN. U.L. REV. 105, 105-07 (1991) and
Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1418, 1420-25 (1981). See also In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981) (questioning
whose judgment should substitute for the incompetent's consent to sterilization).
111. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
112. Id. at 207.
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statute that provided for the sterilization of "habitual criminals" in Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.113  Relying on the Equal Protection
Clause," 4 the Court established procreation as a fundamental human right
that is "basic to the perpetuation of [the] race" 1 5 and protected under the
right to privacy.1" 6 Nevertheless, the Court did not deny that such rights
may be qualified by a compelling state interest, 17 nor did the Court declare
that all sterilization statutes are invalid.'
18
113. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
114. Id. at 541. But cf. Cook v. Oregon, 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) (deny-
ing an equal protection claim against the mandatory sterilization of a mentally retarded girl).
115. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
116. The right of privacy has been recognized within the personal liberty context of the
Fourteenth Amendment and within the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. These privacy rights
include: the right to abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); the right to interracial
marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); the right to use contraceptives, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and the right to procreate, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
As in Mickle and Davis, the Court in Skinner noted that "[there is no redemption for the
individual whom the [sterilization] law touches .... He is forever deprived of a basic liberty."
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. However, such would not be the case with Norplant since it is
reversible.
117. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. For a justification of denying fundamental rights because of
a "compelling state interest," see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154-56. Similarly, Judge
Broadman, in In re Johnson, justified denying Darlene Johnson the right to bear children be-
cause of a compelling interest in the protection of unborn children. See supra note 80.
118. In Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986), the Arizona Supreme Court
reviewed the history of eugenic sterilization laws. It stated that,
Indiana ... enacted the first compulsory eugenic sterilization law in 1907, under
which sterilization of confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists in state insti-
tutions, when recommended by a board of experts, was made mandatory. Fifteen
other states passed similar measures by 1917, 32 states had enacted such legislation
by 1942, but by 1968 the total had dropped to 27 states retaining eugenic sterilization
laws.
Id. at 1103.
Presently, at least 23 states have statutes specifically referring to sterilization, although not
necessarily mandating eugenic sterilization. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-49-101 to -304
(Michie 1987) (regarding sterilization of mental incompetents pursuant to petition or medical
certification); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1950-1969 (West 1991) (authorizing procedures for steril-
izing developmentally disabled persons); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-132 (1989) (providing
that consent to sterilization shall not be made a condition for release from any institution);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-1 12 (West 1986) (requiring consent for any sterilization proce-
dure); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-690 to -700 (West Supp. 1991) (allowing for steriliza-
tion upon the consent of the court); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5716 (1983 & Supp.
1990) (allowing involuntary sterilization); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1968 (1989) (prohibiting ster-
ilization of persons in facilities for the mentally retarded by employees of those facilities); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.046(7) (West Supp. 1991) (regarding the sterilization of delinquent children);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215(4)(e) (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting guardians of incapacitated
persons from authorizing sterilizations without a court order); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1 to -
6 (Michie 1991) (regarding sterilizations of mentally incompetent persons); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 560.5-601 to -612 (1988) (allowing sterilization when it is in the best interest of the ward);
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Mandatory sterilization also raises due process issues under the Four-
teenth Amendment." 9  Chief Justice Stone, concurring in Skinner, ad-
dressed the due process claim:
Undoubtedly a state may, after appropriate inquiry, constitution-
ally interfere with the personal liberty of the individual to prevent
the transmission by inheritance of his socially injurious tendencies.
... [However,] [a] law which condemns, without hearing, all the
individuals of a class to so harsh a measure as the present because
some or even many merit condemnation, is lacking in the first prin-
ciples of due process. And so, while the state may protect itself
from the demonstrably inheritable tendencies of the individual
which are injurious to society, the most elementary notions of due
process would seem to require it to take appropriate steps to safe-
guard the liberty of the individual by affording him, before he is
condemned to an irreparable injury in his person, some opportu-
nity to show that he is without such inheritable tendencies. 2
Only one of the three proposed purposes in using Norplant"2 ' would pass
muster under this reasoning-the mandatory use of Norplant for repeated
gestational substance abusers. Here, the objective sought is to prevent the
birth of drug-addicted newborns. In Cook v. Oregon, the court found,
The state's concern for the welfare of its citizenry extends to future
generations and when there is overwhelming evidence ... that a
potential parent will be unable to provide a proper environment for
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to -3910 (1985) (allowing for involuntary sterilization); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7001-7017 (West 1988) (regarding due process in sterilization proce-
dures); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-214(c) (1990) (prohibiting sterilization as a
ground for either the loss of privilege or immunity to which patient is otherwise entitled or the
receipt of any public benefits); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12(W) (West 1983) (regard-
ing consent before physician may perform procedure); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19
(1981 & Supp. 1991) (authorizing sterilization of inmates in specific institutions); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:6D-5(4) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) (prohibiting sterilization of mentally disabled
persons without consent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-36 to -50 (1990) (allowing sterilization of
mentally ill or mentally retarded persons); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.205-.335 (1989) (requiring
consent before sterilization or an order of the court stating sterilization is in the best interest of
the individual); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-4.2 (1987) (regarding consent for steriliza-
tion of a minor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-108 (1987) (allowing sterilization of minors upon
written request); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3174b-2 (West 1968 & Supp. 1991) (except-
ing sexual sterilization from authorized medical treatments that may be performed without
consent); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-6-101 to -116 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (regarding steriliza-
tion of handicapped persons); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2974 to -2980 (Michie 1991) (allowing
for court-authorized sterilizations); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1 to -4 (1986) (allowing steriliza-
tion of mental incompetents upon consent and court authorization).
119. See, e.g., McKinney v. McKinney, 805 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1991) (invalidating an Arkan-
sas statute that allows for involuntary sterilization without court authorization).
120. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 544-45 (Stone, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
121. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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a child because of his own mental illness or mental retardation, the
state has sufficient interest to order sterilization.1
22
Each pregnant, addicted defendant is entitled to present evidence that the
fetus will not be born addicted and that she will be capable of providing a
proper environment for the child. Therefore, any due process claims can be
overcome before a court may sentence her to implantation of Norplant. 23
Another objective in mandatorily imposing Norplant is to reduce inci-
dences of child abuse; however, due process requirements will not necessar-
ily be met because of the difficulty in predicting the recidivism of physical
and sexual child abusers. 124 Likewise, it will be difficult to demonstrate that
the use of Norplant will effectively control minority populations, if that is
indeed the admitted objective. Thus, the mandatory use of Norplant in
preventing child abuse and controlling populations will likely be a violation
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The mandatory use of Norplant for any reason may also be contrary to
the First Amendment if the use of birth control is adverse to a woman's
religious beliefs.' 2  Nevertheless, although "conditions imposed by the
122. 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (Or. Ct. App. 1972); see also In re Sterilization of Moore, 221
S.E.2d 307 (N.C. 1976) (validating a sterilization statute as a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power).
123. Due process also guarantees that Norplant will be removed if the woman later shows
at a hearing that she has undergone treatment, become drug-free, and will remain so.
124. Compare Randal C. Shaffer, Comment, Protecting the Innocent: Confrontation, Coy v.
Iowa, and Televised Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 78 Ky. L.J. 803, 815 (1989-90)
(citing David L. Armstrong & John S. Gillig, Responding to Child SexualAbuse and Exploita-
tion: The Kentucky Approach, 16 N. Ky. L. REV. 17 (1988)) ("This crime is one that feeds
upon itself, as more than eighty percent of child sexual abusers were themselves victims of
abuse as children.") and Raymond C. O'Brien, Pedophilia: The Legal Predicament of Clergy, 4
J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 91, 114 (1988) (recognizing patterns of future abuse com-
mitted by those who were abused as children) with John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse
Literature: A Call for Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1725-26 (1990) (citing
DAVID FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 47 (1984))
(" '[A] history of molesting may play a role in the creation of some child molesters ....
[However,] most children who are molested do not go on to become molesters themselves.
This is particularly true among women, who whether victimized or not rarely become offend-
ers.' ") and James M. Peters et al., Why Prosecute Child Abuse?, 34 S.D. L. REV. 649, 654-55
(1989) (discussing evidence contrary to findings that abusers are themselves victims of abuse).
The Supreme Court recognized the former of the two positions in New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982), stating, "It has been found that sexually exploited children are unable
to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, and have a
tendency to become sexual abusers as adults."
125. For example, Catholics may have a First Amendment claim against the mandatory
imposition of birth control because birth control violates their religious tenets. For a brief
discussion of the Free Exercise Clause in opposition to the right to refuse other kinds of medi-
cal treatment see Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1519, 1669-70 (1990).
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court should be designed to assist the [defendant] in leading a law-abiding
life... [and] reasonably related to his rehabilitation and not unduly restric-
tive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of religion,"'' 26 the state's
compelling interest in the protection of human life has been held to outweigh
the religious objections. 127
Mandatory sterilization through the use of Norplant is inevitably at odds
with the fundamental right of procreation recognized in Skinner and other
similar cases. Despite the fact that Norplant may defeat First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims within a very specific context, it is unlikely
that a court will find both a sufficient compelling state interest and clear and
convincing proof of prospective abuse such that it can deny a woman the
fundamental right to bear children without her consent.
B. Voluntary Sterilization
If a court may not legally impose Norplant mandatorily, it is still possible
that Norplant may be offered as a means of sentence reduction or as a condi-
tion of probation. Courts have broad discretion in prescribing reasonable
conditions of probation' 28 and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse
of this discretion.' 29 Recently, Texas District Judge Doug Shaver used his
discretion and ordered the implantation of Norplant as part of a plea bargain
agreement.130  Cathy Lanel Knighten pleaded guilty to injuring her ten-
month-old daughter after hidden video cameras in her daughter's hospital
room twice captured Knighten placing her hands over the child's face for
more than a minute in an effort to smother her. 3 ' Knighten was ordered to
serve ten years of probation, which included five years of using Norplant and
her participation in parenting classes.' 32 Additionally, she has been denied
126. Rodriguez v. Florida, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
127. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981)
(ordering a caesarean section performed against the woman's religious objections based on the
compelling state interest in the unborn fetus); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.) (ordering blood transfusion to a pregnant Jehovah's Witness),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d
443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (parents' constitutional right to freedom of religion must yield to the
compelling state interest in protecting the unborn when a blood transfusion is necessary). But
see St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (patient may refuse
blood transfusion on grounds of religious belief).
128. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3563 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
129. United States v. Wickenhauser, 710 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing United
States v. Rifen, 634 F.2d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1980)).
130. Judge Orders Mother to Be Given Contraceptive, UPI, Sept. 6, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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unsupervised visits with her other children for ten years. 133 This case dem-
onstrates the use of Norplant as both a means of plea bargaining for preg-
nant women and a rehabilitative tool for the courts.
In People v. Blankenship,134 a twenty-three-year-old man convicted of
statutory rape appealed the condition of probation requiring sterilization. 1
35
The District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of California upheld
the condition on the grounds that it protected the health and welfare of the
citizens of the state. 36 The court commented on whether the sterilization
was voluntary:
[I]t may be remarked that appellant was not compelled by the con-
dition which the court imposed to submit to an operation whose
effect would be to foreclose him from procreation. He was permit-
ted to elect whether he would comply with the condition and re-
ceive the clemency which he asked or decline to submit to the
operation and accept the penalty which the law provides as punish-
ment for his offense.
137
Thus, the defendant was not coerced into accepting the sterilization proce-
dure, but rather the procedure was voluntarily accepted as a valid condition
of probation. 138
The facts surrounding a given condition of probation, whether mandatory
or voluntary, must be confronted before the condition may be found uncon-
stitutional. For example, a condition of probation which prohibits procrea-
tion is reasonable if it relates to child endangerment and the possibility of
prospective abuse. 139 Therefore, the use of Norplant as a condition in sen-
tencing will be valid if it is shown to be effective and least restrictive in con-
fronting facts of the case and if it passes constitutional muster.
133. Id.
134. 61 P.2d 352 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
135. Id. at 352.
136. Id. at 353. Arguably the state's interest in protecting its citizens extends to prenatal
life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
137. Blankenship, 61 P.2d at 353-54.
138. For another example of voluntary sterilization as a condition of sentencing, see Briley
v. California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977). But see California v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr.
290, 293-95 (Ct. App. 1967) (impliedly overruling Blankenship, in which it was found unrea-
sonable to require as a condition of probation that a woman convicted of second-degree rob-
bery not become pregnant until after she became married). Other courts have upheld such
conditions if accompanied by statutory authority. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d
1101 (Ariz. 1986). Similarly, the court in United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1969),
held that it was a reasonable condition of probation to prohibit one from associating with
certain activist groups with whom he broke the law. Smith at 636. The court found that, "[h]e
could have rejected probation and elected prison. He chose to enjoy the benefits of probation;
he must also endure its restrictions." Id.
139. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
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In Rodriguez v. Florida,"4 the Florida District Court of Appeal found
that the particularized facts of the case did not mandate certain conditions of
probation that were imposed.' 4' After pleading guilty to aggravated child
abuse, the defendant was placed on ten years of probation which prohibited
her from marrying, becoming pregnant, and retaining custody of children. 142
The court held that the prohibition on pregnancy was invalid because it was
punitive in nature and unrelated to rehabilitation.143 The Rodriguez court
offered a standard by which courts may determine if a condition of probation
is not reasonably related to rehabilitation. If the condition: "(1) has no rela-
tionship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to con-
duct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality[,] then it is not reason-
ably related to rehabilitation."'" In this case, the condition prohibiting
pregnancy was not related to future criminality because the custody of the
children was already restricted by another condition which was upheld.'45
However, this reasoning is not applicable to gestational substance abuse
cases since the abuse takes place in the mother's womb, which is not affected
by a custody decision. The court in People v. Pointer, 4 6 confirmed this rea-
soning when it stated,
Although cases in other jurisdictions have concluded that a condi-
tion of probation that a defendant not become pregnant has no
140. 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
141. Id. at 10.
142. Id. at 8.
143. See id. at 10; see also United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 883 (9th Cir. 1979)
(restrictions on fundamental rights must serve the broad purposes of the Probation Act), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980)
("[P]unishment of an offender may not be the primary purpose of the judge's imposition of
probation." (citing United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975)); Louisi-
ana v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952, 953 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (a valid probation condition must be
reasonably related to rehabilitating the defendant); Ohio v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (court may not impose arbitrary conditions that are only remotely re-
lated to the objectives of education and rehabilitation). But see United States v. Torrez-Flores,
624 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1980) (condition of probation need not be reasonably related to the
rehabilitation of the defendant and the protection of the public).
144. Rodriquez, 378 So. 2d at 9; see also Thomas v. Florida, 519 So. 2d 1113, 114 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (using similar criteria to determine validity of probation conditions).
145. Rodriquez, 378 So. 2d at 10. See also Howland v. Florida, 420 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (possibility that condition of prohibition from fathering a child was re-
lated to future criminal conduct was foreclosed by other valid conditions of probation). The
attorney for Darlene Johnson argues against her conditioned probation with the same reason-
ing: "The conditions of probation have to be related in some way to rehabilitation ....
Preventing someone from having a child really doesn't have anything to do with the crime of
child abuse. Case law says child abuse is remedied by removing the child. Contraception is
too broad a remedy." Lev, supra note 10, at A17 (quoting Charles Rothbaum).
146. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
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relation to the crime of child abuse or to future criminality, those
cases relied heavily upon the fact that the abuse could be entirely
avoided by removal of any children from the custody of the de-
fendant. This case is distinguishable, however, because of evidence
that the harm sought to be prevented by the trial court may occur
before birth.
1 47
Assuming gestational substance abuse is a criminal offense,' 4 a condition
restricting pregnancy is valid under this standard if the condition is directly
related to the crime.
Furthermore, Norplant may be a rehabilitative tool because it assures that
the abusive parent will not bear children within an extended period of time,
thereby alleviating the risk of abuse' 49 and affording her an opportunity to
seek psychological or rehabilitative treatment. Once the conditions of pro-
bation are met, Norplant may be removed. In Burns v. United States,"5 ° the
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of probation is "to provide a period
of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of a penitent offender; to take ad-
vantage of an opportunity for reformation which [might otherwise be] ...
less probable." 5 ' Norplant does just this. It is not meant to cure the under-
lying problem, nor is it meant solely to punish. It is meant to aid in rehabili-
tation so that the abusive parents may, in the future, more fully appreciate
the rights and responsibilities-and the lives-that they have abused.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is a puzzling and unfortunate fact that people who abuse children, for
whatever reason, continue to have children. It is also frustrating that wo-
men who are addicted to drugs and who make no effort to treat their addic-
tion continue to have children. It is also sad that underprivileged people
who cannot afford to put food in their own mouths continue to have chil-
147. Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
148. For a discussion supporting the criminalization of prenatal conduct, see Flannery,
supra note 50.
149. In In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307 (N.C. 1976), the court commented on
the justification for the sterilization of mentally ill persons in specific situations which may be
equally as applicable to gestational substance abusers:
[T]he sterilization of a mentally ill or retarded individual at certain times may be in
the best interest of that individual. The mentally ill or retarded individual may not
be capable of determining his inability to cope with children. In addition, he may be
capable of functioning in society and caring for his own needs but may be unable to
handle the additional responsibility of children .... Therefore, the [s]tate may only
be providing for the welfare of the individual when this individual is unable to do so
for himself.
Id. at 312-13.
150. 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
151. Id. at 220.
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dren. To some-like Judge Howard Broadman-the arrival of Norplant has
allowed the courts an opportunity to address these unfortunate facts. Others
argue that its use only adds to this list.
Whatever its effect, Norplant has significantly altered the reproductive
field in terms of a woman's options. The potential technology that lies ahead
in the twenty-first century will only magnify its significance. If recent cases
are any indication of Norplant's effect in the legal field, then the use of the
drug will continue to be a contested issue.
Implantation of Norplant will remain a sentencing option available to the
courts. If it is offered within the scope of a plea bargain or as a probation
condition and collateral rights surrounding its effect have been voluntarily
waived, then it will be a valid means of solving problems related to the de-
fendant's ability to raise children. This is especially true for women who
continue to abuse substances during gestation and, consequently, are unable
to care for themselves and their addicted child. However, when the defend-
ant opposes the implantation of Norplant, other constitutional issues become
more relevant. The courts will have the difficult task of weighing the rele-
vance of these constitutional issues against the objectives underlying each
particular decision involving Norplant. Because Norplant is neither restric-
tive in its effect nor "cruel and unusual," and is medically proven to be safe
and effective for most women, the drug will continue to be used as a method
of reversible sterilization. Most importantly, Norplant will be available as a
consideration for the courts because children continue to be abused and ne-
glected by parents who lack the opportunity to help themselves.
